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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
[E]ven charity itself almost ceases to be a virtue, when they, whose duty
it is to provide for the poor, make private charity a pretext for public
neglect....
.... It seems eminently proper and just, that the treasury of the county,
which bears the expense of his support, imprisonment and trial, should also
be chargeable with his defense.79
Don D. Buchwald*
MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY FOR AN
"UNCRASHWORThY" AUTOMOBILE
During the year 1965, 49,000 Americans were killed in highway accidents and
1,800,000 were injured, a rate which, if sustained, means that one out of every
two living Americans will someday be injured on the highway and one out of
72 will be killed.' Research has shown, however, that the traffic casualty rate can
be substantially reduced by designing automobiles to provide better protection
to passengers during a collision.2 The increasing desire on the part of many for
this improved protection is indicated by the safety-belt installation campaign
of the last decade,3 the recent congressional hearings on automotive safety,4
79 Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 18-19 (1854). [Emphasis added.]
* Editorial Supervisor, J. Philip Hunter.
1 Time Essay, "Why Cars Must-and Can-Be Made Safer," Time, April 1, 1966, p. 26.
This essay further points out that though the number of fatalities has increased 297 since
1961, the death rate has been cut by two-thirds since the 1930's to 5.6 per 100 million vehicle
miles in 1965. This decline has been referred to as "an illusion of progress in traffic safety"
because of the likelihood that the decline has been affected by such factors as better methods
of keeping accident victims alive, increased urbanization, and imprecise methods of acquiring
--- statistics. O'Connell, "Taming the Automobile," 58 Nw. U.L. Rev. 299-300 (1963).
2 An example of private research on automobile safety that has been made available to
auto manufacturers is the Automotive Crash Injury Research Project of the Cornell Aero-
nautical Laboratory, Inc. as published in Automotive Crash Injury Research Bulletins, Nos.
1-8 (June 1962 to Jan. 1966). The degree to which traffic casualty statistics are affected by
unsafe driving as opposed to unsafe vehicles has been much discussed. Ralph Nader seeks to
distinguish between the two when he says: "While the automobile may not be a primary
factor in all first collisions-the impacting of the car-it is definitely a primary factor in
nearly all of the second collisions-when occupants are thrown against the interior of the
vehicle." Nader, "Automobile Design: Evidence Catching Up With the Law," 42 Denver
L.C.J. 32, 33 (1965). The problem of the second collision has been graphically described:
The thicket of hard and/or sharp objects inside an automobile, including the metal
instrument panel with its protruding controls and knobs, the steering assembly, wind-
shield, windshield pillars, roof, rear-view mirror, door and window knobs, to name only
a few, make the automobile a veritable armory of active weapons against a helpless,
moving passenger.
O'Connell, supra note 1, at 344. For an opinion that the human factor in accidents has been
grossly over-emphasized in proportion to the design factor see id. at 307-11. It has been
estimated that elimination of mechanically hazardous features of interior construction would
prevent approximately 75% of traffic fatalities. Moynihan, "Public Health and Traffic Safety,"
51 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 93, 97 (1960), quoting Dr. C. Hunter Shelden from the Journal of
the American Medical Association.
3 For a summary of the degree and effectiveness of seat belt utilization during this period
see Stern, "Seat Belt Utilization," Automotive Crash Injury Research Bulletin No. 8 (Jan.
1966) (published by the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc.). For an example of recent
legislation making the installation of seat belts on new cars mandatory see Wis. Stat. Ann.
4 Hearings Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 49 (19665).
§ 347.48 (Supp. 1966).
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and the enactment of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966.r Significantly, the auto manufacturers have played a passive rather than
an active role in this quest for more crashworthy vehicles. Seat belts were in-
stalled as standard equipment on new cars only after a vigorous public cam-
paign. Dual brakes, anchorages for shoulder harnesses, and collapsible steering
columns were made standard equipment on most 1967 models only after the
congressional hearings had taken place and the legislation had become inevitable.6
Since auto manufacturers must have been aware of the ever-increasing traffic
casualty statistics, and since they must have been capable of installing safety
features which would have made their vehicles more crashworthy, many persons
feel that this passive role is unjustifiable and irresponsible
It is in this context that the recent case of Evans v. General Motors Corp.8
was decided. There, the decedent was killed when his 1961 Chevrolet station
wagon was hit broadside at an intersection. The personal representative of his
estate alleged that, because decedent's car was designed with an X frame instead
of a perimeter frame,9 the side of the car collapsed upon impact and caused
his death. General Motors was charged with negligence in designing the auto,
breach of implied warranty, and strict tort liability for equipping the decedent's
auto with the inferior X frame. Plaintiff's decision to rely on these three theories
of recovery emphasizes the rapid development which has taken place in the
products liability field. Some states have candidly adopted the doctrine that a
manufacturer is strictly liable for the harm caused by defects in his goods.'0
Many other states have, to varying degrees, accomplished a similar result,
either by disregarding the privity restriction in warranty law, or by permitting
a liberal utilization of the res ipsa loquitur and negligence per se doctrines in
negligence law." Hence, a manufacturer could conceivably be held liable for
producing an uncrashworthy automobile under the negligence, implied warranty,
or strict liability theories, depending upon the jurisdiction in which the action
is brought.
5 Pub. L. No. 89-563 (Sept. 9, 1966). This act directed the Secretary of Commerce to
establish safety standards for new motor vehicles and equipment. The initial standards were
issued on Jan. 31, 1967, and are to be revised on or before Jan. 31, 1968. The act
itself sets up no specific standards to be followed by auto manufacturers. With respect to
regulations proposed by the Commerce Department on November 30, 1966, see note 116 infra.
6 The safety improvements made on 1967 models are described in "Autos," Time, Sept. 9,
1966, p. 91. Further developments programed by Ford for 1969 include cars with collapsible
front ends designed to crumple systematically and cushion collisions.
7 For criticism of the passive role played by auto manufacturers in auto safety see Keats,
The Insolent Chariots 97-101 (1958) ; Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed (1965) ; Moynihan, supra
note 2; O'Connell, supra note 1, at 356-70; Time Essay, supra note 1.
8 359 F.2d 822 7th Cir., (applying Indiana law,) cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 83 (1966).
9 The difference between an X frame and a perimeter frame is that an X frame has no
rails running parallel and directly against the body sides of the car between the front and
rear axles, while the perimeter frame, on the other hand, incorporates such rails completely
around the perimeter of the chassis, under the sheet metal. For discussion of the differences
between the two types of frames as advertised by various auto manufacturers including
General Motors Corp., see Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 4-11, Evans v. General Motors
Corp. supra note 8.
10 For discussion of which products and in which states the strict liability doctrine applies
see Prosser, Torts § 97, at 674-78 (3d ed. 1964). For discussion of what constitutes a defect
see notes 99-101 infra and accompanying text.
11 See Noel, "Manufacturers of Products: The Drift Toward Strict Liability," 24 Tenn. L.
Rev. 963, 977-80, 985-98 (f957); Wade, "Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers," 19 Sw.
L.J. 9-9 (1965); Comment, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1350, 1369-70 (1966).
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Negligence
A successful action in negligence against an auto manufacturer would require
proof of four elements: (1) that the manufacturer owes the user a duty of due
care in the design, construction, and assembly of its vehicles so that they are
reasonably safe when involved in collisions, (2) that the manufacturer breached
this duty, (3) that the plaintiff was harmed, and (4) that the plaintiff's harm
was in fact caused by the manufacturer's breach of duty.'2
A. Duty. There are at least five obstacles which must be overcome if a
manufacturer is to be found to owe a duty to design and construct his autos
so that they are reasonably safe for occupants when involved in collisions.
1. The Privity Requirement. Prior to MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.' the
general rule was that the manufacturer owed no duty to persons not in privity
of contract with him.' 4 Since most automobiles are purchased from dealers
instead of directly from manufacturers, nearly all users were without a cause
of action in negligence against the manufacturer who had produced a defective
automobile. MacPherson held the auto manufacturer liable in negligence for
injuries caused by the collapse of a defective wheel, even though the person
injured purchased the automobile from a dealer instead of directly from the
manufacturer. 1 Today all jurisdictions in the United States have gone at least
as far as MacPherson in holding that a manufacturer owes the ultimate pur-
chaser of his product a duty to protect against defects which make the product
inherently or imminently dangerous.16 An uncrashworthy automobile, however,
might be considered neither inherently17 nor imminently' 8 dangerous. Further-
more, a person injured in an automobile collision may very well not be the
original purchaser of the automobile. Nevertheless, though the terms "inherently
dangerous" and/or "imminently dangerous" continue to be required by some
courts in order to circumvent the privity obstacle,19 there are decisions in a
12 See Prosser, supra note 10, § 30, at 146.
13 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
14 See Prosser, supra note 10, § 96, at 659-61; Comment, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1350, 1356
(1966).
15 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
16 See Prosser, supra note 10, § 96, at 661. Though Prosser lists Mississippi as a possible
exception, Triplett v. American Creosote Works, Inc., 251 Miss. 727, 171 So. 2d 342 (1965)
seems to indicate by implication an adoption of the MacPherson doctrine. This is pointed out
in Comment, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1350, 1356 nA1 (1966). Also federal courts have for some time
interpreted Mississippi law as not requiring privity of contract for recovery in negligence. See
Necaise v. Chrysler Corp. 335 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1964); Grey v. Hayes-Sammons Chem. Co.,
310 F.2d 291, 297 (5th Cir. 1962).
17 1 Hursh, American Law of Products Liability § 6:20, at 545 (1961) defines inherently
dangerous products as follows:
For purposes of the rule that privity of contract is not necessary to recovery against a
manufacturer or seller of a product for injury to person or property traceable to the
inherently dangerous character of the product, a product is held to be inherently
dangerous where the danger of injury therefrom stems from the nature of the product
itself, and not to any defect in the product.
The term "inherently dangerous" has been used with regard to issues other than privity. See
notes 38-43 infra and accompanying text.
18 A product has been described as imminently dangerous "qf, although it is not dangerous
by its nature and is safe to be used for the purpose intended when properly constructed, it
contains a defect which renders it dangerous when applied to its intended use .... "1 1 Hursh,
supra note 17, § 6:25, at 568. It has been asserted that an automobile involved in a collision
is not being used for its intended purpose. See note 31 infra and accompanying text.
19 Southern Arizona York Refrigeration Co. v. Bush Mfg. Co., 331 F.2d 1, 8-9 (9th Cir.
1964) ; Casey v. Byrd, 259 N.C. 721, 131 S.E.2d 375 (1963) ; Sutton v. Diimmel, 55 Wash. 2d
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great many jurisdictions in which the manufacturer has been held liable to
persons not in privity with him for defective products without regard to
whether they are "inherently" or "imminently" dangerous.20 Likewise, there
is authority that the duty of due care in the manufacture of products extends
to all foreseeable users.21 Hence, at least in many of these jurisdictions, the
privity obstacle alone will not prevent injured users of an uncrashworthy car
from recovering in an action of negligenice against the manufacturer.
2. The Design Defect Distinction. Although a manufacturer's duty to protect
against defects in construction and assembly of the product has been generally
recognized, courts have sometimes been hesitant to impose a duty where alleged
design defects are involved.22 This hesitancy probably results from the reason-
ing that, whereas defects in construction or assembly of a product arise from
failure to follow established production procedures, defects in design evolve from
creative error and are much more nebulous and difficult to prove. In spite of
this difficulty of proof, the overwhelming weight of authority is that a manu-
facturer owes users the duty of due care in the design of a product.2 3 Such a rule
is in most cases essential to a recovery in negligence for injuries sustained during
a collision in an uncrashworthy car, for the alleged defect will usually be one of
design.
3. The Patent-Latent Danger Distinction.24 It has been held that, although
592, 349 P.2d 226 (1960). For additional cases see 1 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability§ 5.03(1), at 30.1 n.2.1 (1964).20 Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
988 (1956); Reed & Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1934); Lill v. Murphy Door
Bed Co., 290 IB. App. 328, 8 N.E. 2d 714 (1937). For additional cases see 1 Frumer & Fried-
man, supra note 19, § 5.03(1), at 30.2-30.5 nn. 3-31.
21 Tomao v. A. P. De Sanno & Son, Inc., 209 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1954) (applying Massa-
chusetts law); Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. De Lape, 109 F.2d 598, 601-02 (9th Cir.
1940) (applying California law); Lill v. Murphy Door Bed Co., 290 Il. App. 328, 8 N.E.2d
714 (1937); Okker v. Chrome Furniture Mfg. Corp., 26 N.J. Super. 295, 97 A.2d 699 (App.
Div. 1953); Rosebrock v. General Elec. Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.. 571 (1923). For addi-
tional cases see 1 Frumer & Friedman, supra note 19, § 5.03(1) (c), at 34-35 nn. 2-8; Prosser,
supra note 10, § 96, at 662-63 nn. 52-55. There are also cases which hold the manufacturer
liable in negligence to injured persons who were not even users of the product but were in the
vicinity of its probable use. See 1 Frumer & Friedman, supra note 19, § 5.03(1), at 35-36 n.9;
Prosser, supra note 10, § 96, at 663 nn. 56-58.
22 See Noel, "Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product," 71
Yale L.J. 816 (1962). See also Amason v. Ford Motor Co., 80 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1935);
Davlin v. Henry Ford & Son, Inc., 20 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1927).
23 E.g., Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961); Carpini v. Pittsburgh
& Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954); Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F.2d 310(6th Cir. 1930); Bird v. Ford Motor Co., 15 F. Supp. 590 (W.D.N.Y. 1936); 2 Harper& James, Torts §§ 28.3-28.4, at 1540-42 (1956) ; Restatement (Second), Torts § 398 (1965).
24 Framing this distinction in terms of patent and latent defects is not satisfactory where
considerations of negligent design are involved, though such terminology is satisfactory in
negligent production cases. This is because in production cases the existence of the defect
depends not on the failure to protect against danger but on the product's failure to conform
to design specifications, and the requirement that the defect be latent may limit the manu-
facturer's liability. In design cases, on the other hand, a defect causing personal injury only
exists if there is unreasonable failure to protect against the danger, and the requirement that
the danger be latent may limit the finding of a defect in the first place. Thus, the patent-
latent defect distinction applied to design cases presupposes the answer to the real question
of whether a defect exists. The patent-latent danger distinction is not only more appropriate
to design cases but it also encompasses production cases because all production defects causing
personal injury are necessarily dangerous and therefore such latent defects are also latent
dangers.
Illustrative of products which may be classed as patently dangerous are a carving knife, a
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a manufacturer owes the duty to users to protect against latent dangers in his
product, he is under no duty to protect against those dangers which are patent25
because, in the latter case, the manufacturer has the right to expect that the
user will do everything necessary to avoid the danger. 26 Accordingly, an .auto
manufacturer would argue that, because the dangers of a collision are under-
stood by every auto user and are clearly to be avoided, there is no duty to
design an automobile capable of withstanding collisions. This argument has two
weaknesses. First, in most cases which hold that there is no liability for failure
to protect against a patent danger, the danger could have been avoided by the
exercise of extreme care on the part of the user.27 An automobile collision, on
the other hand, may be unavoidable, though the user exercises the utmost cau-
tion. Second, even where the danger is avoidable and patent, some courts have
held a manufacturer liable for failing to reasonably protect against such danger.
For example, in De Eugenio v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. 28 the plaintiff was
injured when he fell against the moving parts of a hay-baling chute which was
not equipped with a guard. Recovery against the manufacturer was permitted
even though the absence of the guard was patent and the consequent danger was
avoidable by. the use of extreme care on the part of the user.29
4. The Intended-Unintended Use Distinction. It has been held that a manu-
facturer has the duty only to make his products safe for their intended use.3 0
buzzsaw, or an airplane with an exposed propeller. In Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95
N.E.2d 802 (1950), an onion-topping machine, allegedly defective because it had no stopping
device or guard, involved a patent danger. Typical of latent dangers in a product are a
defective automobile wheel, see MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E.
1050 (1916), or an imperfectly constructed scaffold, see Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882),
or the unwise location of a petcock on a bus, see Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus. Co.,
216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954).
25 Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F. Supp. 677, 679 (S.D. Tex. 1963); Stevens v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100 P.2d 723 (1940); Campo v. Scofield, supra note 24,
at 472, 95 N.E.2d at 804; Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 253 Wis. 558, 34 N.W.2d 853
(1948).
26 Campo v. Scofield, supra note 24, at 472, 95 N.E.2d at 804.
27 Thus, in Campo v. Scofield, supra note 24, the obvious danger presented by an onion-
topping machine without a guard could have been avoided by the exercise of extreme care
on the part of the injured plaintiff. This is not to say that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent. See note 59 infra and accompanying text. In Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 163 Cal,
App. 2d 393, 329 P.2d 605 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958) the injury sustained by a boy when he ran
into the radiator ornament of a parked car could have been avoided by greater care on the
part of the boy. In Thomas v. Jerominek, 8 Misc. 2d 517, 170 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. Ulster
County 1957) greater care on the part of an auto passenger could have avoided injury sus-
tained when a door handle was mistaken for a similarly appearing window handle and the
rear-hinged door inadvertently blew open while the car was in motion.
28 210 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1954).
29 For other cases holding a manufacturer liable for failing to protect against a patent
danger see Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 338 Ill. App. 364, 87 N.E.2d 307 (1949), afi'd, 407 InI.
121, 94 N.E.2d 847 (1950); Karsteadt v. Phillip Gross Hardware & Supply Co., 179 Wis.
110, 190 N.W. 844 (1922). See also 2 Harper & James, Torts § 28.5, at 1542-46 (1956); Noel,
supra note 22, at 836-41.
30 Mannsz v. MacWhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445, 450 (3d Cir. 1946); Poore v. Edgar Bros. Co.,
33 Cal. App. 2d 6, 90 P.2d 808 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939); Zesch v. Abrasive Co., 354 Mo. 1147,
1154, 193 S.W.2d 581, 585 (1946); Restatement, Torts § 395 (1934). More recently many
courts have described a manufacturer's duty to produce safe products as extending to the
ordinary or normal use of the product. See, e.g., McCready v. United Iron & Steel Co., 272
F.2d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d 102, 105 (2d
Cir. 1954). Because these courts continue to talk of a single ordinary or normal use, it is
doubtful that this criterion is much different from the older intended use distinction. For
consideration of whether the involvement of an automobile in a collision is an ordinary use
of the product, see note 91 infra and accompanying text.
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Accordingly, it can be argued that, because an auto manufacturer does not
intend his vehicles to become involved in collisions, he is not liable for even the
most uncrashworthy vehicle.3 1 There is, however, substantial authority holding
that a manufacturer owes the user or consumer a duty to make his products safe
for reasonably foreseeable, though unintended, uses. For example, in Phillips v.
Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc.,32 a woman, attempting to reach a cupboard,
was injured when part of an aluminum chair on which she was standing gave
way. The chair had a U-shaped base and tended to tip forward when weight
was placed near the front. The court held that, because it could be reasonably
anticipated that the chairs would be used to stand upon even though this was
not their intended purpose, the manufacturer owed a duty to make them safe for
this purpose.33 Under this line of authority it can be asserted that because the
involvement of autos in collisions is reasonably foreseeable, the manufacturer's
duty of due care extends to making his autos crashworthy.
It is significant that the typical case involving an allegedly uncrashworthy
automobile is distinguishable from other automobile products-liability cases in-
volving accidents caused by such things as defective brakes, 34 a defective
wheel,35 a defective door-lock mechanism, 36 or a car which tends to oversteer.37
In the latter cases the defect caused an otherwise normal and intended set of
circumstances, such as routine driving on an average road, to become dangerous.
The defects in an allegedly uncrashworthy automobile, on the other hand, arise
only in an abnormal and unintended context, an automobile collision.
5. The Inherent Danger Distinction. In the typical automobile products
liability case the defect causes the accident. In the case of the uncrashworthy
automobile the accident would have occurred wholly apart from any defect,
and it is merely claimed that if the defect had not been present the victim
would have been better protected from injury. This distinction is illustrated in
the case of Poore v. Edgar Bros. Co.3 8 There the plaintiff was cut by broken
glass from his window during an auto accident and the court held that there was
no negligence on the part of the manufacturer or vendor because (1) the window
glass was not inherently dangerous, but became dangerous only when an outside
force intervened, and (2) the window glass was not intended to withstand
severe blows as a part of its ordinary use. Authority has been cited which contra-
venes the intended-unintended use distinction made in Poore when the distinc-
tion stands alone.3 9 Likewise, the inherent danger distinction, standing alone, is
31 Brief for Defendant-Appellee, p. 2a, Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 83 (1966). See also Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d
822, 825 (1966).
32 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
33 For other authority that a manufacturer owes the duty to make his product safe for
foreseeable but unintended uses see Tracy v. Finn Equip. Co., 310 F.2d 436 (6th Cir. 1962);
Brooks v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 410, 329 P.2d 575 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958);
Calkins v. Sandven, 256 Iowa 682, 129 N.W.2d 1 (1964); Farley v. Edward E. Tower Co.,
271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930) ; Clement v. Crosby & Co., 148 Mich. 293, 111 N.W. 745
(1907); Steele v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 107 Ohio App. 379, 159 N.E.2d 469 (1958);
Restatement (Second), Torts § 395, comments j and k (1965).
34 E.g., Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
35 E.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
38 E.g., McKinney v. Frodsham, 57 Wash. 2d 126, 356 P.2d 100 (1960).
37 Drummond v. General Motors Corp., 35 U.S.L. Week 2119 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 29,
1966) (case involving a "Corvair" in which manufacturer was held not liable).
38 33 Cal. App. 2d 6, 90 P.2d 808 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939).
39 See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
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vitiated by a substantial number of cases which hold that a manufacturer has
a duty to protect users of his product from dangers which would not exist but
for some foreseeable intervening cause.40
The Poore case presents the typical auto collision situation and resolves the
simultaneous existence of an extraneously-caused danger and an unintended
use in favor of the manufacturer. However, because other courts have found a
duty to protect against dangers involving either an extraneous cause or an un-
intended use alone, it seems that to impose a similar duty where both elements
appear together would not be unreasonable. This has been done in at least one
case. In Ford Motor Co. v. Zahnl the driver of the automobile in which plaintiff
was a passenger was forced to slam on the brakes when another car suddenly
darted in front of him. The plaintiff was thrown forward and his eye was injured
on an ash tray with a jagged edge. The court held Ford liable for the negligent
manufacture of the ash tray, reasoning that the negligence of the unidentified
driver of the other car was foreseeable, and "such acts do not interrupt the con-
nection between the original negligence and the injury. '42 Significantly, the ash
tray was not inherently dangerous, but became dangerous only when an outside
force intervened, and the automobile was not being used in a normal or intended
manner when the driver slammed on the brakes sufficiently hard to throw his
passenger against the dashboard.43
B. Breack of Duty. Should the plaintiff succeed in convincing the court
40 For example, in Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954),
an extraneous object "cooperated" with the faulty design of a petcock causing the brakes on
a bus to fail and the plaintiff to be injured. No accident would have occurred if it had not
been for the intervening cause of the extraneous object hitting the petcock, yet because this
intervening cause was deemed foreseeable, the court held the manufacturer owed a duty to
prevent such an accident from occurring. See also Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729
(8th Cir. 1959) ; Steele v. Rapp, 183 Kan. 371, 327 P.2d 1053 (1958) ; Haberly v. Reardon
Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958); Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957).
41 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959).
42 Id. at 734.
43 Another example of a case in which a manufacturer has been held to owe a duty to
protect against a danger extraneously caused during an unintended use of the product is the
lower court decision of Mickle v. Blackmon, Cir. Ct., 6th Judicial Cir., York County, S.C.
(March 1963) as discussed in Nader, supra note 2, at 37. In that case the plaintiff sustained
injury when, as the result of a collision, she was thrown against the inadequately protected
gear-shift lever of a 1949 Ford. Although the lever was only dangerous when an outside
force intervened, and although the automobile was involved in the unintended situation of a
collision, the court held the manufacturer liable for the unsafe design of the lever. See also
Bird v. Ford Motor Co., 15 F. Supp. 590 (W.D.N.Y. 1936), in which the theory of recovery
was negligence, though an express warranty of shatterproof glass was involved.
Underlying the discussion of foreseeability in both the intended-unintended use and
inherent danger distinctions is the issue of proximate cause which is usually considered as a
limitation on the duty concept in negligence. Proximate cause is discussed at length in Ford
Motor Co. v. Zahn, supra note 41, at 733, where the rule is stated:
If the negligence was such that the defendant, in the exercise of ordinary care, ought
to have anticipated that such negligence was liable to result in injury to others, then
the defendant is liable for any injury proximately resulting therefrom, although defendant
could not have anticipated the particular injury which plaintiff suffered.
In the Zahn case the issue of proximate cause was held to be a jury question. Ibid. Likewise
in most typical negligence actions against the manufacturer for producing an uncrashworthy
automobile, reasonable men could at least differ as to whether the manufacturer should have
foreseen that the alleged defect was liable to result in injury to users.
For further discussion of the duty of a manufacturer to produce a crashworthy vehicle see
Nader, supra note 2; Philo, "Automobile Products Liability Litigation," 4 Duquesne U.L.
Rev. 181, 188 (1965). Noel, supra note 22, deals more generally with the issue of a manu-
facturer's negligence of design.
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that the auto manufacturer owes the user a duty to produce crashworthy
vehicles, the manufacturer must still be shown to have breached this duty by
failing to exercise due care in the manufacture or design of the vehicle in
question. First it must be shown that some aspect of the vehicle does in fact
create undue danger for occupants during a collision. Once this is accomplished,
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine may be invoked in many cases to raise the presump-
tion or permissible inference4 4 that the defect resulted from negligence on the
part of the manufacturer. 5 The three traditional requirements of the doctrine4 6
can be furnished by arguing: (1) that the defect does not ordinarily exist in
the absence of negligence,47 (2) that the design and manufacture of the defective
vehicle was in the exclusive control of the auto manufacturer, and (3) that the
plaintiff was in no way responsible for the presence of the defect. In rebutting
this presumption or inference48 of negligence, the defendant manufacturer may
set forth such evidence as thorough testing of the vehicle without the defect
becoming apparent, or industry-wide usage showing conformity with reasonable
standards. Custom, however, is not conclusive evidence of reasonable prudence,
for negligent conduct may well prevail in an entire community or industry.49
C. Cause in Fact. The issue of cause in fact is reached only after it has
been determined that the manufacturer breached his duty towards the plaintiff.
In the majority opinion of Evans v. General Motors Corp.,50 Judge Knoch
briefly touched on the problem when he said:
Plaintiff does not assert that the "X frame caused the decedent's auto-
44 For discussion of whether the res ipsa loquitur doctrine raises a rebuttable presumption
or a permissible inference of negligence see 1 Frumer & Friedman, supra note 19, § 12.03(6),
at 315-16; Comment, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1350, 1366-67 (1966).
45 Representative of products liability negligence cases in which res ipsa loquitur has been
successfully invoked against the manufacturer are Becker v. American Airlines, Inc., 200
F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Gandy v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 341 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1960). For additional cases see 1 Frumer & Friedman, supra note 19, § 12.03(2),
at 290-93 nn. 2-38. Most cases employing the res ipsa loquitur doctrine involve defects in
manufacture rather than defects in design. This is probably because in most cases involving
alleged design defects, once the plaintiff has established that the design is unreasonably
dangerous and that the harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable, the inference of negligence on
the part of the designer follows naturally. Such an inference is not natural in the case of an
alleged defect in the construction or assembly of a product because of the possibilities that
such a defect might ordinarily exist apart from negligence, might occur after the product left
the control of the manufacturer, and might have been contributed to by the plaintiff. There
seems to be no authority for the position that res ipsa loquitur cannot be invoked in the
case of an alleged design defect, and in fact at least one case indicates that it can. Hercules
Powder Co. v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America, 151 Cal. App. 2d 387, 395, 311 P.2d
907, 913 (1957).
46 For discussion of the three traditional requirements of the doctrine and the existence in
some cases of a fourth requirement of superior knowledge see 1 Frumer & Friedman, supra
note 19, § 12.03(1), at 285-86; Prosser, supra note 10, § 39, at 218.
47 More specifically the line of reasoning that could be taken here is that (a) the duty of
the manufacturer to produce crashworthy cars has been established, (b) due care in the
performance of this duty requires sufficient testing of automobile products to assure their
crashworthiness, and (c) such testing would ordinarily lead to detection of the unsafe condi-
tion in question.
48 See note 44 supra.
49 What is customary and usual in a particular situation has often been the controlling
factor in determining what is reasonably prudent, but, in the words of Judge Learned Hand,
"strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of
new and available devices.' The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287
U.S. 662 (1932).50 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 83 (1966).
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mobile to be driven into the path of the striking car or prevented it from
being driven out of that path. Nor does plaintiff contend that the decedent
could not have been killed or injured in this same collision had the 1961
Chevrolet station wagon been designed with a perimeter frame.51  I
The question can be stated: But for the manufacturer's negligence in producing
a defective vehicle, would the plaintiff have been injured as seriously as in fact
he was? 52 Plaintiff may show that his injury would not have been as serious by
introducing circumstantial evidence 53 and expert testimony.54 In order to get
the issue to the jury there need be only a reasonable probability that the alleged
defect did in fact increase plaintiff's injury.55
D. Deenses.56 Once the negligence of the auto manufacturer for producing
an uncrashworthy car is established, he may still escape liability by proving
that the plaintiff either was contributorily negligent57 or assumed the risk
created by the defendant's negligence. These defenses are available in products-
liability negligence cases just as in negligence cases generally.58 Thus, where a
collision involving a defective vehicle is caused by the plaintiff's own negligence,
the defense of contributory negligence may bar recovery. 59 Likewise it could be
argued that the uncrashworthy nature of an automobile is in the news daily
and the risk of danger created by a rigid steering column or protruding radio
knob during a collision is obvious to every automobile rider, and assumed by
him. Defendant manufacturers generally prefer, however, to incorporate both
these defenses into their initial denial of the existence of a duty.60 This is
advantageous to the defendant for two reasons. First, asserting a defense against
negligence may sometimes be interpreted as an indication of defendant's un-
51 Id. at 824.
52 For consideration of the "but for" rule see Prosser, supra note 10, § 41, at 242-43.
53 See Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 338 Ill. App. 364, 87 N.E.2d 307 (1949), aff'd, 407 Ill.
121, 94 N.E.2d 847 (1950) (circumstantial evidence used to show that a defective vaporizer
caused a fire).
54 See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1964) (expert testimony on operation of hydraulic automobile brakes is proper evidence to
show cause of brake failure).
55 See Prosser, supra note 10, § 41, at 245. See also note 102 infra and accompanying text
regarding the advantage an individual plaintiff has once an issue gets before the jury.
56 See generally 1 Frumer & Friedman, supra note 19, §§ 13-14; Keeton, "Assumption of
Products Risks," 19 Sw. L.J. 61 (1965); Noel, supra note 22, at 873; Comment, 64 Mich. L.
Rev. 1350, 1368-69 (1966).
5T Contributory negligence is not a complete defense in the few jurisdictions which have
adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence. See Prosser, supra note 10, § 66, at 443-49
for discussion of which jurisdictions have adopted a comparative negligence doctrine and
with regard to what types of cases.
58 See Pinto v. Clairol, Inc., 324 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1963); Siemer v. Midwest Mower
Corp., 286 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1961); Saeter v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 186 Cal. App.
2d 248, 8 Cal. Rptr. 747 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Runnels v. Dixie Drive-It-Yourself Sys.,
Inc., 220 Miss. 678, 71 So. 2d 453 (1954).
59 Saeter v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., supra note 58. See also Hixson v. International
Harvester Co., 219 Cal. App. 2d 88, 32 Cal. Rptr. 905 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). The last clear
chance doctrine is irrelevant in cases involving defective products because the negligent act of
the defendant manufacturer must necessarily have preceded the negligent act of the plaintiff.
See Prosser, supra note 10, § 65, at 437-43. For consideration of the case where plaintiff
could have avoided the accident by use of extreme care as distinguished from ordinary care
see note 27 supra and accompanying text.
60 This probably accounts for the dearth of products-liability negligence cases in which the
assumption of risk defense has been interposed. 1 Frumer & Friedman, supra note 19, § 14, at
349.
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certainty as to his own freedom from negligence. Second, whereas the issue of
duty is decided as a matter of law, the issues of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk, where in reasonable doubt, are decided by the jury, which is
likely to be sympathetic to the plaintiff.6 '
The issue of contributory negligence may be translated into duty language
by phrasing the question in such terms as whether the manufacturer owed users
the duty to make his product safe for unintended uses,6 2 whether the duty existed
to protect users from dangers extraneously created,63 or, more generally, whether
defendant's negligence proximately caused plaintiff's injury when plaintiff's
own negligence was itself a significant cause.64 Framing the question in terms
of proximate cause, however, usually presents a jury question, and the manu-
facturer is likely to restrict his argument to the duty issue which presents only
a question of law.
The equivalent of assumption of risk is encountered in the holding of many
courts that a manufacturer is under no duty to users to protect against patent
dangers.6 5 It has been shown, however, that courts are not unanimous in their
acceptance of this rule.65 The unavoidable automobile collision presents a
peculiarly strong case for its abandonment.6 7 The question remains, then,
whether the defendant manufacturer could escape liability by asserting plaintiff's
assumption of risk or contributory negligence in the event the court determines
that the manufacturer owes the duty to protect automobile users from the ob-
vious dangers inherent in a collision. The probable answer is that, if the court
feels plaintiff is not entitled to recovery because he assumed the risk or was
contributorily negligent, it would interpret defendant's duty accordingly, and
the defenses would be disallowed as a matter of law.68 As to the assumption of
risk defense, this could be justified by arguing that the average automobile user
at any given instant considers the likelihood of a collision remote and conse-
quently probably fails to fully appreciate dangers such as those created by hard
protruding objects inside the car or the design weakness of an X frame. 9
61 Comment, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1350, 1368 (1966). Regarding the propensity of juries to
favor individual plaintiffs over defendant corporations see note 102 infra.
62 See notes 30-37 supra and accompanying text.
63 See notes 38-43 supra and accompanying text.
64 See note 43 supra.
65 See cases cited in note 25 supra.
68 See notes 28-29 supra.
67 See notes 26 and 27 supra and accompanying text.
68 For criticism of the practice of deciding the question in terms of duty instead of
assumption of risk see Keeton, supra note 56, at 68.69 For the defense of assumption of risk to be valid the plaintiff must not only have
knowledge of the facts which create the danger but he must fully appreciate the danger as
well. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glen L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120, 126 (6th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956); Varas v. Barco Mfg. Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 246, 263, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 737, 747 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Prosser, Torts § 67, at 462 (3d ed. 1964). Where the
plaintiff is not actually aware of the danger but in the exercise of ordinary care should have
been aware of it, the issue is one of contributory negligence rather than assumption of risk.
Ward v. Knapp, 134 Cal. App. 2d 538, 540, 286 P.2d 370, 372 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955). Where
the assumption of a risk would be unreasonable because the advantage sought is out of
proportion to the danger presented, issues of both assumption of risk and contributory
negligence are presented and there is an overlap between the two doctrines. Prosser, supra, at
451. In most cases the utility of using an automobile would appear to outweigh the danger of
a defect which would make the automobile unsafe in the event of a collision and such use
would not be unreasonable.
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Warranty
A second theory of recovery which could be asserted against an auto manu-
facturer by a person injured during a collision in an allegedly uncrashworthy
car is breach of warranty. The Uniform Commercial Code, which is the law
today in nearly all the states,70 deals with express and implied sales warranties
in sections 2-312 through 2-318. Section 2-318, however, extends a seller's war-
ranty only to persons in the family or household of the buyer or guests in his
home,71 and the third comment to that section declares that the Code is neutral
and is not intended to restrict developing case law on the issue of "whether the
seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in
the distributive chain."172 This "neutral" position on the privity issue raises a
question concerning the extent to which the Code controls on other issues in
cases where the plaintiff is not in privity with the defendant but succeeds in
overcoming this obstacle on the basis of case law. The very fact that the Code
asserts neutrality on the privity issue implies that it is not neutral on other issues
which might arise in such a case. 73 If this implication was not intended, the
comment would better have simply stated that the Code did not apply to cases
involving persons in the distributive chain other than those specifically listed.
But even if the Code is interpreted as not applying directly to cases involving these
persons, it could well be argued that the Code applies by analogy to such cases
and should be given substantial weight.7 4 Accordingly, the effect of the Uniform
70 As of June 17, 1966, only Louisiana, Idaho, and Arizona had not enacted the Uniform
Commercial Code. 1 CCH Installment Credit Guide 4451-52 (1966). [Unless otherwise
indicated all references are to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1958, Official text with Com-
ments (hereinafter cited as UCC).]
71 When California enacted the UCC it omitted section 2-318 in its entirety, criticizing it
as "a step backward." Wiier & Hart, Uniform Commercial Code Reporter-Digest § 2-318,
at 1-100 (1966). Alabama, Colorado, Texas, Utah, and Virginia substantially alter § 2-318 so
that a seller's warranty extends to all persons who may be reasonably expected to use,
consume, or be affected by the goods. Unif. Laws Ann., Uniform Commercial Code §§ 1-101
to 3-803, pp. 61-62 (Supp. 1965).
72 UCC § 2-318, comment 3. The various state legislatures have not enacted into law
the comments to the Code, and hence the comments should be given far less weight than
the Code's text. Nevertheless, the comments should be considered in interpreting the text
where there is more than one possible construction of a provision, since they not only re-
flect the drafters' intent but they facilitate a uniform construction of the Code by the courts
of the various enacting states. Accordingly, comment 3 to UCC § 2-318 would seem to pre-
clude the possible construction of that section that persons apart from the buyer, his family,
household, or guests have no action for breach of warranty. The courts have generally con-
sidered § 2-318 in light of the comment. See, e.g., Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Corp., 80 N.J. Super. 184, 193 A.2d 275 (App. Div. 1963). The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, however, has recently given the section the restrictive construction seemingly precluded
by comment 3, saying: "the comment to the Code ... which is the basis for the argument
that the language of section 2-318 is precatory only was never enacted by the Pennsylvania
Legislature." Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, -, 221 A.2d 320, 325 (1966). This decision is all
the more surprising in light of Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966), handed
down by the same court on the same day, in which the strict product-liability doctrine of
the Restatement (Second), Torts § 402(a) (1964) was adopted in Pennsylvania for the first
time. As if to accentuate the anomaly, the majority opinion in Webb cites the dissenting
opinion in Miller in support of the need for allowing such recovery in spite of the lack of
privity. Id. at -, 220 A.2d at 854.
73 Comment 2 to UCC § 2-313 states:
The provisions of Section 2-318 on third party beneficiaries expressly recognize .
case law development within one particular area. Beyond that, the matter is left to the
case law with the intention that the policies of this Act may offer useful guidance in
dealing with further cases as they arise.
74 Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934) applied the Uniform Sales Act by
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Commercial Code upon non-privity issues will be considered in the remaining
discussion of auto manufacturer's liability for breach of warranty, even though
the typical plaintiff is not in privity with the auto manufacturer.
A. Express Warranty. Where an auto manufacturer expressly warrants his
product to be free from a particular defect which has caused harm to the person
to whom the warranty was made, the manufacturer is liable for such harm.
Successful suits for breach of express warranty, for example, have been main-
tained for injury sustained in auto collisions where purported shatterproof glass
shattered7 5 and where a purported seamless roof actually contained a jagged
seam.76 However, it is unusual for auto manufacturers to expressly warrant that
their automobiles, or parts thereof, are safe in a collision. 77 The typical breach
of warranty action against an auto manufacturer for an uncrashworthy product
will most likely be based on a theory of implied warranty.
B. Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose. An implied
warranty of fitness for a particular pupose is made where the seller at the time
of sale has reason to know that the buyer requires the goods for a particular
purpose and is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish ap-
propriate goods.78 To hold that an auto manufacturer has made such a warranty
as to the crashworthiness of his product would require reasoning that his buyer,
in most cases the retailer, relied on his skill or judgment to furnish automobiles
appropriate for the "particular purpose" of becoming involved in collisions. It
seems that this is at most a secondary concern of automobile retailers. Further-
more, the "particular purpose" has been cast in terms of a purpose peculiar to
the needs of the particular buyer,79 a clarification which makes the finding of
this kind of warranty on the part of auto manufacturers all the more difficult.8 0
C. Implied Warranty of Merclantability. Prior to the Uniform Commercial
Code merchantable articles were variously described as those which are fit for
analogy to a case involving corporate stock which it intimated were not goods within the
meaning of the Act. But see Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter, 41 Del. Ch. 549, 570-71, 200
A.2d 441, 454 (Sup. Ct. 1964) where the court refused to apply the UCC by analogy be-
cause the corporate trustee was not a "merchant" within the meaning of the Code. The
reasoning of this case seems unsound since, if the UCC can be applied by analogy at all,
the drawing of an analogy between a corporate trustee and a "merchant" would seem
reasonable. For further discussion of the applicability of the UCC by analogy see Comment,
8 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 81 (1966).
75 Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, aff'd, 168 Wash. 456, 15 P.2d
1118 (1932). For definitions of an express warranty see UCC § 2-313(1); Uniform Sales
Act § 12.
76 Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939).
77 It is conceivable that a cause of action for breach of express warranty could proceed
under the theory that the whole tone of the manufacturer's advertising was such as would
naturally lull the consumer into a false sense of security, whereas in reality the product was
unreasonably dangerous when involved in a collision.
78 UCC § 2-315.
79 Comment 2 to UCC § 2-315 states:
A "particular purpose" differs from the ordinary purpose for which the goods are
used in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer which is peculiar to the nature of
his business whereas the ordinary purposes for which goods are used are those envisaged
in the concept of merchantability and go to uses which are customarily made of the
goods in question.
But see 1 Williston, Sales § 235, at 605 (rev. ed. 1948).
80 An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose could exist in such situations
as where an automobile is purchased specifically for racing or police work.
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the general purpose for which they are sold,8 ' those which are suitable for the
ordinary use for which they are sold,8 2 or those which are of the general kind
described at the time of sale.83 The Uniform Commercial Code requires all
merchantable goods to at least be such as "pass without objection in the trade
under the contract description," and "are fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used.
814
The claim that an auto manufacturer breached an implied warranty of mer-
chantability in selling the plaintiff an uncrashworthy car is subject to three
difficulties. First, nearly all contracts for the sale of new cars expressly limit
the extent of any express or implied warranty to replacement of defective parts
and thus seem to negate the possibility of recovery for personal injuries. One
such disclaimer was, however, recently held by the New Jersey Supreme Court
to be invalid as against public policy because not the result of actual bar-
gaining between the parties to the sale.85 Under the Uniform Commercial
Code a disclaimer of warranty of merchantability is invalid unless "merchant-
ability" is specifically used in the language of the disclaimer and, in the case
of a writing, is conspicuous.
8 6
A second difficulty is the concept of privity which has traditionally restricted
any breach of warranty action to the parties to the sales contract.8 7 In recent
years, however, courts in a number of jurisdictions have, either candidly,88 or
by invoking one of a number of fictions,89 disregarded this requirement, and,
81 Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 694, 268 P.2d 1041, 1048 (1954);
Twombley v. Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476, 491, 158 A.2d 110, 118 (1960); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 370, 161 A.2d 69, 76 (1960).
82 Vincent v. Nicholas E. Tsiknas Co., 337 Mass. 726, 729, 151 N.E.2d 263, 265 (1958);
Mead v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440, 442, 108 N.E.2d 757, 758 (1953).
83 Leavitt v. Fiberloid Co., 196 Mass. 440, 451, 82 N.E. 682, 687 (1907); Uniform Sales
Act § 15(2); 1 Williston, supra note 79, § 243, at 642.
84 UCC § 2-314(2) in full requires all merchantable goods to at least be such as:
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and (b) in the
case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and (c) are
fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and (d) run, within the
variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each
unit and among all units involved; and (e) are adequately contained, packaged, and
labeled as the agreement may require; and (f) conform to the promises or affirmations
of fact made on the container or label if any.
Note that failure to meet any one of these criteria renders the goods unmerchantable.
85 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 81 (decided prior to adoption of
the UCC in New Jersey). See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc.,
252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961); General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App.
438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960) ; Prosser, supra note 69, § 97, at 680; UCC § 2-302 which states
in part, "If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract .... 
89 UCC § 2-316(2).
87 For a discussion of the applicability of the UCC to this issue see notes 70-74 supra
and accompanying text.
88 Vandercook & Son, Inc. v. Thorpe, 344 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1965) (applying Florida
law); Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963); Piercefield v.
Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
89 In some cases manufacturers were held liable on a warranty theory where merchandise
did not measure up to advertisements or product labels. See Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966) ; Randy Knit-
wear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363
(1962) ; Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965). In other
cases liability has been found on the theory that the seller was an agent of the manufacturer
or a conduit for the goods. See Rogers v. U.S. Rubber Co., 91 N.H. 398, 20 A.2d 626
(1941) ; General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, supra note 85.
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provided the plaintiff finds himself in the right jurisdiction, this obstacle to
recovery can be overcome.
The third, and probably the greatest, difficulty lies in convincing the court
that an uncrashworthy automobile is, in fact, unmerchantable. A manufacturer
has a strong argument in favor of his autos' being merchantable under the
Uniform Commercial Code criteria,90 since the features which have made auto-
mobiles relatively uncrashworthy up to the present time have been found in
many, if not all, automobiles produced by all manufacturers. Furthermore,
these features become dangerous only in a collision which may not be considered
by the court to be an ordinary use of an auto. On the other hand, it could be
argued that because such a high percentage of vehicles eventually become in-
volved in accidents,91 collisions are within the scope of an automobile's ordinary
use. Whether or not the automobile in question is found to be merchantable will
in the final analysis probably depend on the court's determination of whether an
automobile collision constitutes one of "the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used" under the Uniform Commercial Code.92
Strict Liability
Recovery under a theory of strict product liability in tort,93 where adopted,94
requires only that a plaintiff show a defective product, the existence of the
defect when the product left the control of the manufacturer, injury,95 and
cause in fact.9 6
In most cases the existence of injury is clear. The problem of cause in fact
is identical to the problem previously discussed under negligence and may be
handled in the same manner there suggested.97 Because in most situations in-
volving a purportedly uncrashworthy automobile the alleged defect is one of
design, proving that the defect existed at the time the product left the
control of the manufacturer will usually be relatively simple.98 Whether or
9D See note 84 supra.
91 More than 1/4 of all American automobiles are involved in injury-producing accidents.
Time Essay, "Why Cars Must-and Can-Be Made Safer," Time, April 1, 1966, p. 26.
92 See note 84 supra. On sales warranties generally see Hogan, "The Highways and Some
of the Byways in the Sales and Bulk Sales Articles of the Uniform Commercial Code," 48
Cornell L.Q. 1, 3-10 (1962); Comment, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1430 (1966).
93 This theory of recovery has emerged as the result of the parallel evolution of negli-
gence and warranty law in the products-liability field. On the negligence side it is no longer
necessary for a plaintiff to show a lack of due care on the part of the manufacturer. On
the warranty side a plaintiff need no longer show that a product is not what it was repre-
sented to be and the privity restriction does not apply. See note 11 supra and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the contrast between the UCC's warranty approach to products
liability and the strict products-liability theory see Rapson, "Products Liability Under
Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability
in Tort," 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 692 (1965).
94 See note 10 supra.
Or Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) extends recovery
beyond personal injury loss to pure economic loss. But see Seely v. White Motor Co., 63
Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
96 Regarding these requirements, see generally Restatement, (Second), Torts § 402(a)
(1965) ; Rapson, supra note 93, at 698-99.
97 See text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
98 Sometimes where the alleged defect is one of construction or assembly it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to prove that the condition in question existed when the product
left the manufacturer's control. In at least one such case an inference from the circum-
stances surrounding the accident was permitted. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d
256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964). On this problem see generally Comment, 64
Mich. L. Rev. 1350, 1372-75 (1966).
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not the product is defective remains as the major issue under the strict liability
in tort doctrine.
A defective product has variously been referred to as one not "reasonably
fit for the ordinary purposes for which such articles are sold and used" 99 or
one that is unreasonably dangerous to the user or his property.100 The criteria
for determining if a product is unreasonably dangerous1 l0 are similar to those
which are significant in determining whether particular conduct is negligent,
but they also illustrate the essential difference between negligence and strict-
liability concepts. Negligence is concerned with the reasonableness of the manu-
facturer's conduct; strict liability ignores his conduct and emphasizes the safety
of the product itself, given prudent use. It seems that a plaintiff, not himself
negligent, should be able to convince the court at least that reasonable men
could differ as to whether an uncrashworthy automobile is unreasonably dan-
gerous or not reasonably fit for ordinary uses. This would get the issue before
the jury which tends to favor individual plaintiffs over corporate defendants.10 2
The Evans Decision
The majority and dissenting opinions in Evans v. General Motors Corp.103
concentrated almost entirely on the negligence theory asserted by plaintiff and
virtually ignored the warranty and strict liability theories. Because the privity
obstacle to a warranty theory no longer exists in Indiana,104 and because no
mention was made in the opinion of a clause in the sales contract disclaiming
liability, the basis of the court's holding that there was no breach of implied
warranty is probably that the automobile was of merchantable quality. The
plaintiff's strict liability claim was easily met since Indiana courts have not
adopted a strict product-liability doctrine as such. 0 5
In considering the possible negligence of General Motors in designing the
X frame, the judges disagreed as to whether an auto manufacturer owes a
duty to produce a crashworthy vehicle. The majority opinion written by judge
Knoch inferentially accepted General Motors' argument that its only duty
in designing an automobile is to assure that it is "reasonably fit for the purpose
for which it was made, without hiding defects which would make it dangerous
90 Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., supra note 95, at 67, 207 A.2d at 309. The fact
that this language is almost identical to UCC § 2-314(2) (c) suggests that the UCC criteria
of merchantability might also be used as a standard by which a product's defectiveness is
measured. See Rapson, supra note 93, at 700-01.
100 See Restatement (Second), Torts § 402(a) (1965).
101 Some of these criteria are: (1) the utility of the product despite its alleged defect,
(2) the magnitude of the risk created by the alleged defect, (3) the possibility that the
plaintiff could have avoided injury by using the product in a more reasonable manner,
and (4) the availability of a safer substitute. See Wade, "Strict Tort Liability of Manu-
facturers," 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965). See also Comment, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1350, 1374
(1966).
102 Prosser, supra note 69, § 36, at 209; Comments, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1350, 1368 (1966),
74 Yale L.J. 170, 192 (1964).
103 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.) (applying Indiana law), cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 83 (1966).
104 Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245, 254 (7th Cir. 1965) (applying Indi-
ana law).
105 See Prosser supra note 69, § 97, at 674-78; Restatement (Second), Torts § 402(a)
(App. 1966). But see Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965) (ap-
plying Indiana law).
[Vol. 52
to the persons so using it.' '1° 6 The opinion cites Campo v. Scofield'0 7 in support
of the additional argument that, if it is desirable as a matter of public policy
that manufacturers have the higher duty to construct autos in which it is safe
to collide, it is the peculiar function of the legislature to create such a duty.
Judge Kiley, dissenting, rejected both arguments. He adopted a higher stan-
dard of duty, calling for a manufacturer to "use such care in designing its
automobiles that reasonable protection is given purchasers against death and
injury from accidents which are expected and foreseeable yet unavoidable by
the purchaser despite careful use."' 08 As indicated previously, there are cases
which rebut the patent danger, inherent danger, and intended use distinctions
invoked by the majority and which support this higher duty standard. 0 9 Judge
Kiley cited some of these cases and then argued alternatively that, even if
there was no precedent in Indiana establishing the higher standard, yet in
the past, federal courts, "as 'Indiana Courts' in diversity cases, participated
in developing Indiana law.., to meet changing conditions." 110
The disagreement on the duty standard required of auto manufacturers is
understandable in light of the split in authority on each of the issues of the
manufacturer's duty to guard against patent dangers, extraneously caused
dangers, and dangers encountered during an unintended use."' The disagree-
ment as to the role of the courts in adapting law to meet the changing demands
of society reflects the long-standing controversy over the degree to which the
judiciary may or should infringe on the constitutionally appointed role of the
legislature to create and change the law.112
Few people would deny that the current needs of our society require that
auto manufacturers be given the duty to make their products crashworthy.1 3
The court in Evans could have imposed this duty either by citing a pertinent
line of precedent or by invoking public policy as the critical factor in its deci-
sion.1 4 However, the reluctance of the majority of the court to do either
was strategically sound, for a contrary decision would have opened the gates
to a flood of litigation avoidable through appropriate legislation. This is be-
cause the finding of a duty to construct crashworthy vehicles would relate to
a type of automobile already in circulation and possessing identical defects to
that alleged in the instant case.
106 Evans v. General Motors Corp., supra note 103, at 824. General Motors' concept of
its duty in the construction of automobiles is discussed at length in Brief for Defendant-
Appellee, pp. 20-41, Evans v. General Motors, supra note 103.
107 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
108 Evans v. General Motors Corp., supra note 103, at 827 (dissenting opinion).
109 See notes 28, 29, 32, 33, 40 supra.
12O Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 826 (7th Cir.) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 83 (1966), citing Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245
(7th Cir. 1965); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (NM). Ind. 1965).
111 See text accompanying notes 24-43 supra.
112 See United Steelworkers of American v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
113 See notes 1 and 2 supra and accompanying text.
114 As to the latter course of action, see Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,
111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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CONCLUSION
Under a negligence theory the duty of a manufacturer to produce crash-
worthy automobiles depends primarily on the resolution of the conflict between
authorities as to the duty of a manufacturer to protect against patent dangers,
extraneously caused dangers, and dangers occurring during unintended but
reasonably foreseeable uses. The success of the claim that the manufacturer
breached an implied warranty of merchantability when he produced an un-
crashworthy automobile depends on whether a valid disclaimer of such war-
ranty was made at time of sale, whether the particular jurisdiction in which
the action is brought requires privity of contract between the parties, and
whether the automobile is deemed to be of merchantable quality in spite of its
uncrashworthy condition. Under a theory of strict liability, the automobile is
defective and recovery will be allowed if it is unreasonably dangerous to the
user or his property.
In the recent case of Evans v. General Motors Corp.,"15 the court deter-
mined that a manufacturer neither owes the duty to produce crashworthy auto-
mobiles nor breaches a warranty in selling automobiles that are not crash-
worthy. It also stated that the appropriate method of creating new standards
of auto safety is through legislation. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966 is legislation of the type contemplated by the Evans court,
and, hopefully, stringent standards will be imposed on the auto manufacturers
under it." 6 If this occurs, then the Evans court will be vindicated, the critical
needs of society having been met without unnecessary litigation. On the other
hand, should the Secretary of Commerce and the agencies under his control
fail to implement the Act effectively so that significant reforms do not ma-
terialize, then the legislature may well be considered to have failed in its as-
signed role, and the courts may be forced to assume a more active role in
meeting the public demand for crashworthy automobiles.
Harold T. Commons, Jr.*
3l5 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 187 Sup. Ct. 83 (1966).
116 Twenty-three proposed safety standards were issued by the National Traffic Safety
Agency of the Department of Commerce on November 30, 1966. 31 Fed. Reg. 15212 (1966).
Auto manufacturers had until January 3, 1967, to comment upon these proposals and the
final standards went into effect on January 31, 1967. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1967, p. 30,
col. 3.
* Editorial Supervisor, Stephen H. Hutzelman.
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